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I. FIRST THREE YEARS OF LEAGUE'S AND U. N.'s COURTS
That the United Nations' International Court of Justice, as an
advisory organ, has been all but abandoned by U. N. will come as a
shock to the American lawyer, legislator and layman. In many in-
stances legal questions have been raised in the General Assembly and
the Security Council concerning their jurisdiction or competence to
take action. Nevertheless, the General Assembly, which has no enforce-
ment function, has thus far referred only five questions to the Court
for advisory opinions ' and the Security Council, which wields U. N.'s
enforcement powers, has invariably refused to ask the Court's opinion
on any legal question, however fundamental.
At the end of the first three years of the League of Nations, its
Permanent Court of International Justice had docketed thirteen new
contentious cases and rendered four judgments, and had given eight
advisory opinions, some on difficult and important questions.2 In its
first three years, the present International Court docketed and decided
only one contentious case, i. e., Great Britain's claim against Albania
for damages in the Corfu Channel in '46 from mines and shore bat-
t Member, New York City Bar; Chief, Foreign Economic Administration's Mis-
sion to the Netherlands, 1944-45; Member, National Power Pooling Conference, 1936;
Member, Federal Electric Railways Commission, 1910-20; special assistant to Secre-
tary of War. World War I; General Counsel, War Finance Corporation. World
War I.
1. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 130-1, 488 (2d ed.,
1949) ; REPORTS, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 65 (1948) ; see also notes 5. 6,
7 and 7a infra.
2. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-42, 779,
App. No. 22 (1943) ; see also 1 & 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS (1934).
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teries.3 The Court's inaugural sitting was on April 18, '46.4 In
October '49 it received the following contentious cases, not through
the agency of U. N., but through direct application by parties: On
October 1, between the United Kingdom and the Norwegian Govern-
ment as to the limits of the exclusive Norwegian fisheries zone; on
October 17, between the French Republic and the Egyptian Govern-
ment concerning the latter's treatment of certain French nationals or
their property; and on October 20, between the Governments of
Colombia and Peru, as to whether Colombia in January '49 had rightly
granted asylum to a national of Peru whom it regarded as a political
offender.5 The requests by the Assembly to the Court for advice in
the first three-year period were as to (1) whether, on voting in the As-
sembly on the admission of a State to membership, a State can condi-
tion its affirmative vote on the admission of some other State or
States to membership; and (2) whether the U. N. has standing to
sue Members or States for reparations for injuries incurred by
persons in its service.' In its fourth year, on October 22, '49, the
Assembly decided to ask the Court for advice on whether in the trial
of Cardinal Mindszenty and in others, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania
violated human rights and fundamental freedoms, contrary to the decla-
ration of U. N.'s concern for the conduct of non-members in the
Charter's Section 55, and also to the peace treaties between those
States and the victorious allied and associated powers. On December
2, '49 the Court received the Assembly's request for an advisory opin-
ion on whether the Council's failure to recommend a State for admis-
sion to U. N. can affect the validity of action by the General Assembly
admitting such State.7 The Court on December 27, '49, registered
the Assembly's request for an opinion on the international status of
the territory of Southwest Africa vis-a-vis the Union of South Africa
to which it was mandated under the Covenant's Article 22.7a The
Council and the Assembly have invariably taken the position that they
are competent to decide finally any legal question, including the basic
one of their own jurisdiction.'
3. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. suPra note 1, at 61, 68. See I.CJ. YEARBOOK
1947-48, at 55-60 (preliminary) ; also The Corfu Channel Case, Judgment and Order,
April 9, 1949.
4. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 52.
5. See I.C.J. General List, Nos. 5, 6 and 7.,
6. For the first opinion, see I.C.J. YEARBOOK, supra note 3, at 61-4; for the sec-
ond opinion, see I.C.J. REPORTS OF JUOGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERs, 174-
219. 7. For record on Hungary, etc., see General A/1023, Oct. 18, 1949 (Ad Hoc Corn's
report), and A/PV 234 and 235, Oct. 21 and 22, 1949 (Assembly proc'dgs adopting
report). The Court registered the request Nov. 7, 1949 (Gen'l List No. 8). The
Assembly's request on the admission matter is I.C.J. Gen'l List No. 9.
7a. I.C.J. General List, No. 10.
8. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op cit. supra note 1, at 549.
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Contrast this record of U. N.'s political organs to date with the
understanding of U. S. A.'s statesmen when the Charter was up for
ratification in the Senate. The Secretary of State had been head of
the U. S. A. delegation to, and a President of, the San Francisco
Conference. Expounding the Charter to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, he said: "As the United States becomes a party to
a Charter which places justice and international law among its founda-
tion stones, it would naturally accept and use an international court to
apply international law and administer justice. . . . The Interna-
tional Court of Justice which the Charter establishes, has an important
part to play in developing international law just as the courts of Eng-
land and America have helped to form our common law." I Senator
Connally, Chairman of the Senate Committee and a delegate to the
San Francisco Conference,"0 in introducing the Bill for ratification of
the Charter, referred to the new Court as "a vital and essential part
of the World Organization." " Senator Warren R. Austin, sitting in
the Senate Committee at a hearing on the Bill, even expressed fear
lest the new Court be unable to "protect itself under the Charter
against [requests for] a great volume of advisory opinions." 2  And
in its favorable Report on the Bill to the Senate, the Committee said,
"Your Committee recommends that the Senate accept the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. . . . The acceptance . . . will carry for-
ward the tradition of the United States as a champion of judicial set-
tlement of disputes of a legal character." "
Has this unlooked-for neglect of the International Court as legal
adviser, especially by the Council, U. N.'s real executive organ, been
according to the Charter or has there been a violation of it? Does
the language bearing on the two World Courts so differ as to ac-
count for the relative disuse of the new Court; and if not, what does
account for it? 14
Delimitations and Overtones of this Inquiry
Neither the Covenant nor the Charter contemplates judicial re-
view, in the American sense, of the action of a political body on the
9. Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations on Sen. Rep. No. 5737, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1945).
10. THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN
FRANCISco, 1945, SELECTED DOCUMENTS (Dep't of State publ'n No. 2490, 1946) (here-
after referred to as Sel't'd Doc's), p. 59.
11. H.R. Doc. No. 3922, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945).
12. Hearings, stpra note 9, at 336.
13. H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 8, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1945).
14. For a useful documentary comparison of the two World Courts, see Hudson,
The Twenty-Fourth Year of the World Court, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1946).
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motion of a party."5 So far as both documents go, there are only
two ways in which a legal question could come before the World Court
for its action: first, when the question is inherent in a dispute that
the parties have brought to the Court; -" and second, when a political
organ (say, the Council) asks the Court for an advisory opinion on
a legal question involved in a problem. This inquiry touches only the
second or advisory function of the World Court. This function of the
judiciary as advisor to the legislative body is supported by a long line
of precedents: 17 it has been available to the British Parliament through
the Judicial Committee Act of 1833, to parliaments of several Con-
tinental European countries through constitution or statute, and to
legislatures of several North and South American States through
similar authority."
Another delimitation: The Charter creates definite fields of con-
cern for each principal political organ. The General Assembly (Ch.
IV) is to initiate studies and make recommendations to the Members
or to the Security Council to promote international cooperation, etc.
The Security Council (Ch's V, VI and VII) can investigate at any
stage a situation that potentially threatens international peace, and
thereafter make recommendations; and if peace is actually threatened,
can organize enforcement of its orders through economic isolation of
an offending State or through cooperative use of force against it.
The Economic and Social Council (Ch. X) can initiate studies, make
reports with recommendations about observance of "human rights and
fundamental freedoms," and call international conferences on "eco-
nomic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters." These
and other powers express a new ethical-political thrust of world con-
cern for conditions necessarily existing under one flag or another that
are deemed unhealthy for world peace; and they cannot be ignored
while other parts of the Charter are being interpreted. The Charter
obviously intended these organs prima facie to have reasonable latitude
in a bona fide assumption of their own jurisdiction. Not until com-
petence has been seriously challenged would a question arise about re-
sorting to the Court for advice. On this there can be no absolutes.
15. Jessup, The International Court of Justice and Legal Matters, 42 ILL. L. REV.
273 (1947).
16. But see GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, o t. cit. supra note 1, at 548, that one party,
having accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, can alone bring a legal question
to the Court.
17. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 71-80 (2d ed. 1941) ; HUDSON, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 485; Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37
HAnv. L. REv. 970-1001 (1924).
18. Mass citations will be avoided. The terms interpretation and construction will
be used interchangeably. Italics in quotations will be the writer's.
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A political organ's recommendation might have to precede, or be
issued simultaneously with, a request to the Court on the organ's com-
petence to act. Again, an old dispute might not be adjusted through
answering legal questions long overlaid.'9
Americans, North and South, in considering the powers of U. N.'s
Court, are inevitably swayed by the crucial event in American con-
stitutional history, when Chief Justice Marshall for the Supreme Court
in Marbury v. Madison 2 o found that the Constitution empowered the
Court to declare null and void an act of Congress, a decision based only
on the inherent necessity for such judicial supremacy in a constitu-
tional order.2 The Court declared in effect that the new govern-
ment's very existence was at stake.22 The life of U. N. could ultimately
depend on the status of its Court, even for giving advice that the politi-
cal organs can disregard.2 Compared with the document before Mar-
shall, which afforded no words implying the power found by him, the
Charter leaves a break of merely a hair's breadth in the circuit of
meaning to be closed by the spark of inference for requiring that the
Court be consulted. Elsewhere, acceptance of the constitutional prin-
ciple of judicial review has been confined chiefly to large parts of
the Western Hemisphere; 24 but it would be fortunate if in all U. N.
States there could be at least an understanding of that principle and
the extent of its acceptance.
In a sense the Charter aspires to be a constitution. To promote
the true objects of a grant of power a constitution should receive, as
19. Gilmore, United Nations Swnposium, 55 YALE L.J. 1061-62 (1946) (referring
to the Permanent Court's advisory opinions in the Eastern Carelia and Austro-German
Customs Union cases), remarks that there are issues not healthy to be brought before
an international court "because they escape or transcend judicial competence." See
also Hudson, The Twenty-Sixth Year of the World Court, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 15-16:
"In some disputes the legal relations of the parties are subordinate to the political con-
siderations involved."
20. 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
21. 3 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 142 (1916) ; also 1 id. at 323.
22. 3 id. 114-16.
23. GODRICH AND HAMBRO, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 487-8. See HUDSON, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 513, as to the League's reception of the Permanent Court's advisory
opinions.
24. Referring to U.N. Members only: Powers of judicial review, about equiva-
lent to that in the U.S.A., exist in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Haiti, all through express constitutional
requirement except in Argentina (where, as in the Dominican Republic and Paraguay,
the constitution is silent). There is limited review power in Canada, Chile, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay, all
by constitution, except in the Dominican Republic.
In the Eastern Hemisphere: Judicial review is extensive in Liberia; limited in
Greece, Norway, Switzerland, Australia and the Union of South Africa; and non-
existent in Belgium, China, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Russia and
Turkey. See U. S. CONSTITUTION SESQUICENTENNIAL CommISSIoN, HIGH COURTS OF
THE WORLD AND THEIR POWERS, ETC. (1937) ; ARAGON-RVERA, EL PODER JUDICIAL EN
LAS CoNSTITUCiONES AmERiCANAS 18-21 and 38-42 (1944) ; Pound, The Constitution:
Its Development, Adaptability and Future, 13 A.B.A.J. 744 (1947).
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it has in the U. S. A., a fair and liberal construction. 25  In the maift,
the principles of statutory construction are followed, with implication
of powers as well as restraints. 6 Where meaning is doubtful there can
be resort to historical and contemporary conditions 27 including, with
limitations, proceedings in constitutional conventions.28
II. WORLD COURT'S STATUS UNDER COVENANT AND CHARTER
The Permanent Court's functions were created by two instru-
ments: (a) the Covenant of 1919 authorizing the League's political
branches to submit to the Members a "Statute" for a World Court! and
(b) the Statute itself, which was prepared by the Council, approved
by the Assembly for submission to the Members, and brought into
force in 1921.29 By analogy it could conveniently be called a statute.
U. N.'s World Court was created outright by Articles III and
XIV of the Charter. The name "Statute," given to the part of the
Charter detailing the composition, duties and procedure of the Court,
is misleading; " the Charter declares (Art. 92) that it "forms an in-
tegral part of the Charter."
On paper the new Court's position is considerably stronger than
that of the old.
1. The League's Court had no express status as a principal organ.
U. N.'s Court is from the outset (Ch. III, Art. 7) a "principal organ"
and (Ch. XIV, Art. 92), "the principal judicial organ."
2. The Charter (36.3) provides that the Security Council "should
take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be
referred by the parties to the International Court." The Covenant
was silent on this point.
3. The League Court's competence in matters arising under the
Covenant rested solely on Article 36, paragraph 1, giving the Court
25. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1 (U.S. 1824).
26. McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (U.S. 1819); United States v.
Fisher, 2 Cranch 358 (U.S. 1805).
27. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Ex parte Wells, 18 Howard 307
(U.S. 1856).
28. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pa.,
16 Peters 539 (U.S. 1842); People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 48, 19 N.W. 155 (1884).
The 1787 debates in the constitutional convention, voted secret by it, were not avail-
able to Chief Justice Marshall in 1803. James Madison's private notes on the debates,
became public only after his death, nineteen years later. They disclose that judicial
supremacy, irreconcilably debated, could not be dealt with in a document of compro-
mises. See BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 429, 452, 50-100, 100-156, esp'ly 115-
116. HUNT & Scotr, THE DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, esp'ly
49-52, 274-277, 473-475.
29. HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 128.
30. A too literal deference perhaps to the suggestion in Ch. VII of the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals that the United Nation's Court be created on the "basis" of the
League's Statute of the Permanent Court.
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jurisdiction in "all matters specially provided for in treaties or con-
ventions in force." The Charter's Statute of the Court (36.1) states
that the Court's jurisdiction includes also "all matters specially pro-
vided for in the Charter of the United Nations," a distinct gain in
certitude.
4. (a) Under the Covenant (Arts. 12, 13) the Council had to
wait until a dispute was brought to it. The Charter (Art. 34) enables
the Security Council to initiate an investigation of not only a dispute
but also "any situation which might lead to international friction," etc.
(b) Under the Covenant (Art. 15) the Council passively received
a dispute presumably when the parties had already tried arbitration or
the Court, if such disposal was deemed suitable. The Charter (36.1)
enables the Security Council to initiate investigation of a dispute or
situation "at any stage." - The Court's scope was thus potentially
enlarged.
5. The League's Council under the Covenant (Art. 14) had only
implied authority to refer a legal question to the Court: "The Court
may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question re-
ferred to it by the Council or by the Assembly." The Charter (Art.
96.1) expressly declares that the Security Council "may request the
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on any legal
matter."
We shall now see that, when the Charter's Articles 36.3 and
96.1 are read together, (a) the applicable juristic principles of inter-
pretation require the Council to try to induce the parties to refer a
dispute to the Court; (b) if it fails, those principles require it to ask
the Court for an advisory opinion on any legal question in the dispute;
and (c) even more compellingly they require the Council to ask for
such an opinion when it is investigating a situation where only one
State is before it. In other words, the meaning of may request in its
context is not discretionary, but mandatory.
IN MOST LEGAL SYSTEMS MAY MEANS SHALL WHEN AUTHORITY IS
GIVEN PUBLIC OFFICERS IN FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE
For centuries under the Roman-Civil and the Anglo-Ameri-
can systems, the word may has been held to mean shall when used
in connection with an act by an officer in furtherance of justice."2 In
31. Kelsen, The Settlement of Disputes by The Security Council, 2 INT'L L.Q.
173-213 (1948).
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Rock Island County Supervisors v. United States 8 the statutory word
may was given the mandatory meaning. The Court, citing early Eng-
lish cases, said: "Whenever the public interest or individual rights call
for its exercise, the language used, though permissive in form is in fact
peremptory. . . . It [the power] is given as a remedy to those en-
titled to invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be remedyless."
In Michaelson v. United States,"b the Court was construing a
penal statute which provided that trial by the court may be with a jury.
The Court through Justice Sutherland, citing Rock Island County
Supervisors v. United States, said: "The intent of Congress was to
give to the accused the right of trial by a jury, not merely to vest
authority in the judge to call a jury at his discretion." I" The de-
cision should be partly discounted here by the Court's desire to preserve
the statute's constitutionality, but this discount seems counterbalanced
both by the deep stream of unqualified precedent in the Court and by
the established principle that where a treaty fairly admits of two con-
structions the more liberal is preferable. 1b
The mandatory meaning for may request in Article 96.1 has
further support from five chief considerations:
The Council's new power to initiate the clearing-up of a mere situation
reenforces its presumptive duty to refer basic legal questions to
the Court
The Covenant as amended in 1924 provided that before coming
to the Council, disputants should try arbitration or the Court, if such
method was suitable to the character of the dispute. By that time a
dispute might have become too involved for disposal by the Court's
determination of legal issues. The framers of the Covenant thus had
32a. Roman Law has affected most legal systems: see BRYCE, STUDIES IN His-
TORY AND JURISPRUDENCE, I 72-94; 11 635-6, 870-1 (2d ed. 1901) ; YNTEXA, Roman
Law as the Basis for Comparative Law, A CENwTRY OF PROGRESS 346-403 (1937). In
Latin may's equivalent for optional authority is auctoritas or potestas (posse, potest).
for their mandatory meaning, in Civil (Roman) Law, see Calvinus (Kahl) I MAG-
NUM LEXTCON JURIDICUM 160 (1759) based on Roman, Canon and Feudal Laws, II
id. at 275-6; Heuman, 1 HANDLEXICON ZU DEM QUELLEN DES R6miscHEN RECHTS
43-4, 40 (1879): Monier Petite Vocabulaire Rontain, LUCERNA JURIS 47 (1942);
LEBRIJA, LEXICO DE DERECHO CIVIL 97 (1944) ; 2 DwAzRRIs, STATUTES 712 (1831) ; 2
STROUD, THE JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 1174-1176 (2d ed. 1903) ; 26 WORDS AND PHRASES
771-864 (1940). In 1850, in Mason v. Fearson, 9 Howard 248 (U.S. 1850) the Su-
preme Court, assimilating the phrase it shall be lawful to may, applied the ancient
mandatory meaning to a statute that gave authority to public officers.
32b. 71 U.S. 435, 446-447 (1867).
32c. 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
33a. Id. at 70.
33b. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933) ; Jordan v. Tashiro 278
U.S. 123 (1928) ; Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) ; 2 HYDE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1468-
1515 (2d ed. 1945).
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special reasons for giving to the Council by implication the option
whether or not to submit a legal question to the Court. But the
Charter has no such requirement. U. N. disputants can go straight
to the Council; and U. N. can without invitation step in even at the
inception of a "situation" when any legal question would presumably
stand out more clearly for judicial decision. Here sound policy sug-
gests that the Council should not have optional discretion to submit a
legal question to the Court, but should be under the presumptive duty
or even direct mandate to do so. Other features of the Charter also
suggest this.
The Court's sole express authority finally to decide on its own com-
petence implies that such authority was withheld from the political
organs
Another ground for construing may request as mandatory:
Chapter 11 (36.6) of the Charter's Statute of the Court which pro-
vides: "In the event of a dispute as to whether the court has juris-
diction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the court." The
Charter is wholly silent on whether the Assembly or the Council can
finally determine its own competence. As we shall see below, in most
legal systems there is a presumption against a forum's self-serving
final decision that it has competence. 4 Under the League Covenant
(Statute, Art. 36), there was the same express vesting in the Court
alone of power to determine its jurisdiction, without corresponding
express power in Assembly or Council; and the League's Council
seems always to have referred the question of its competence, when
seriously raised, to the Court.3
5
Juristically, such selective vesting in the Court alone of power to
determine its own jurisdiction means that the other organs were not
meant to have that power. The Roman Law principle expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another), calls for this conclusion.
3 6
Suppose we supplied by inference alone the power in the political
bodies to make such final decision. The strange result would then
follow that by wholly induced inference (without any words to inter-
pret), the two political organs would have authority that U. N.'s
principal judicial organ could exercise only through express empower-
34. See text infra, at note 38 et seq.
35. HUtsoN, op. cit. spra note 2, at 523-4.
36. See HALKERTON, COLLECTION OF LATIN MAXImS 45 (1923) ; WEAARTON, LEGAL
MAxims 71, 72 (3d ed. 1903) ; BROWN, A SELECrioN OF LEGAL MAXIMS 443-54 (10th
ed. 1930) ; DwNvAus, op. cit. supra note 32 at 767: "Where an act of Parliament gives
authority to 'one' person expressly all others are excluded" (citing 11 Rep. 59, 64) ; see
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 436 (1902) (construing a treaty).
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ing words. Would not such a result be glaringly contrary to the
expressio unius rule, especially when the document is creating a con-
stitutional arrangement?
The Charter specially indicates the Council's duty to seek advice on its
competence when a State's dispute is with domestic dissidents
Take a case where (a) the Security Council is intervening in a
controversy between a Member State and resident dissidents; (b) the
situation if continued is likely to endanger international peace; and (c)
the State challenges the Council's competence under Article 2, para-
graph 7, on the ground that the matter is its own domestic concern.
After declaring that each Member State is sovereign, the Charter (2.1)
warns: "Nothing contained in this Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the juris-
diction of any State." In such a situation, when the Member State
so challenges the Council's competence, has the Council authority finally
to decide in favor of its own jurisdiction, to issue recommendations
and orders to the State, and to apply force for compliance? Under
96.1, in the case of a dispute between Member States, the Council's
request to the Court "for an advisory opinion on any legal question"
is not made dependent on whether international peace may be en-
dangered. So we have the question: If the situation being dealt with
potentially endangers international peace, could the framers of the
Charter have intended to give the Council more authority when a
State's controversy is with domestic dissidents than when it is with
another Member State? Mr. Evatt, Australian delegate at San Fran-
cisco, in a memorandum in committee, declared that were the Charter
to permit the Council, when pursuing only its conciliatory function
(Ch. VI), to intervene in a State's domestic affairs on the Council's
own finding that a dispute constitutes a threat to peace, this would be
"almost an invitation to use or threaten force in any dispute arising
out of a matter of domestic jurisdiction in the hope of inducing the
Security Council to extort concessions from the State that is threat-
ened." 37 An interpretation of may request as giving the Council more
authority to decide its own competence in such a domestic disturbance
than in an inter-State dispute when there is only a potential threat to
peace, would mean that on a thread of implication easily subject to
manipulation, as Mr. Evatt pointed out, the Council could readily
by-pass the Court and render futile the safeguarding domestic jurisdic-
tion limitation of Article 2. To put it another way: can may request
37. 14 U.N. CONF. Doc. 436-40 (1945).
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reasonably be interpreted to mean that, once the Council has found
peace to be directly or even contingently endangered by a State's
domestic problem, its intervention will continuue to be sanctioned
throughout quiet periods when the question of its competence could
easily be referred to the Court? If so, Article 2, paragraph l's basic
principle, "the sovereign equality of all its Members," would be set at
naught by allowing may to be interpreted literally, when high judicial
authority, as shown above, has construed it as mandatory in contexts
far less compelling.
The Council's presumptive duty to request an advisory opinion is re-
enforced when the legal question could not otherwise reach the
Court
There is another special reason for construing may as shall when
a State in a controversy with resident dissidents is pleading domestic
jurisdiction: If two Member States are in controversy before the Se-
curity Council and one pleads domestic jurisdiction, Article 36, para-
graph 3 affords the natural way for the competence question to be
jointly referred to the Court, i. e., the Council's recommendation to
the parties. But when the dispute is between a State and domestic
dissidents, the Charter has a vacuum. In the first place, under Article
35, only States can be parties before the Security Council for receiving
from it a recommendation that the case be referred to the Court. Sec-
ondly, Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the Court declares:
"Only States or members of the United Nations may be parties in
cases before the Court." As the Charter does not afford any other
way for the legal question to reach the Court in furtherance of jus-
tice, its framers must have intended the Council to be under mandate
to request the Court's opinion.
The presumption against a forum's decision on its own competence
In construing a document, a fundamental concern of the courts
is that, as construed, it shall make sense." The Charter declares (Art.
36 of the Statute): "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all
cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided
for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties or conventions
in force." In two of the three classes thus placed within the Court's
jurisdiction two or more States can certainly submit the matter to the
38. Sullivan v. Kidd, 354 U.S. 433, 439 (1920) ("that all parts of a treaty are to
receive a reasonable construction with a view to giving a fair operation to the whole.
Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. 5, 249").
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Court. The issue of the Council's competence on the score of a State's
domestic concern when that question arises in a dispute between States
belongs in the third class of matters in the Court's jurisdiction because
it is specially provided for in the Charter; but when a controversy
involves only a State and its domestic dissidents it is inherently impos-
sible for it to be referred to the Court "by the parties," as there is only
one. It can reach the Court only if the Council requests an advisory
opinion. But the Council, by its intervention, has already prima facie
asserted its own competence; and, naturally, the longer it acts, the more
fixed does that assertion become. If the Council has the free option
not to ask the Court for legal advice on its competence, would it ever
ask? Would it make sense for the Charter expressly to place this
definite class of questions in the Court's jurisdiction and then to render
it practically certain that they will never reach the Court?
Under most Roman-Civil and Anglo-American systems, parties
are safeguarded when a forum declares its own competence. Such de-
cisions by lower courts are subject to appeal.39 Assumption of juris-
diction cannot confer authority where it does not exist,40 and a court
is bound to take notice of the limits of its own authority.4' For the
Charter to provide that the question raised when a State challenges
the Council's competence is ipso facto in the Court's jurisdiction, and
then not to afford any way for the question to reach the Court except
through the optional grace of the Council itself, would be contrary to
the principles, first, that a forum's self-serving decision on the issue of
its own jurisdiction is presumptively subject to question, and second,
that a statute must if possible be construed as a logical structure of
ideas. The accepted standards for interpreting treaties suggest that
if the framers of the Charter had in mind creating a situation so
anomalous, they would have said so by expressly vesting in the political
bodies as they did in the Court the power to be final judges of their own
competence.
39. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938) ; Rex v. Stock, 8 Adolphus and Ellis
405 (1838) ; Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Com'tee, 2 K.B. 859 (1910) ; KLEIN AND
ENGEL, DER ZIVILPROZESS OEsTERREICHs 121-133 (1927); I GLASSON AND TISSIER,
TRAITA THAORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANISATION JUDICIARE, LE COMPETENCE ET DE
PROCEDURE cIVrLE 673 (1925-9) ; id. Vol. II at 236, Vol. III at 450, 481; I GomEz
ORBANEJA AND HERCE QUEMADA, DERECHo PROCESAL, 143 et seq. (1946).
40. Brougham v. Oceanic Steam-Navigation Co., 205 Fed. 857 (2d Cir. 1913);
Reeves v. Buttler, Gilberts Chancery 195 (1726) ; Rorke v. Errington, 7 H.L. Cas.
617 (1859) ; Cowley v. Cowley, App. Cas. 450 (1901). Indeed under London Corp'n
v. Cox, L.R. 2 H.L. 239 (1867), the plaintiff is liable for execution of process from
an inferior court acting beyond its jurisdiction, and the judge or court officer also if
he knew of the defect.
41. Reid v. United States, 211 U.S. 529 (1909).
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III. ADMISSIBILITY AND POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS IN CONSTRUING THE CHARTER
The role of "preparatory work" in interpretation
So the Charter's language alone seems to require a political organ
to refer legal questions, including that of its own competence, to the
Court. Opposed to this interpretation there is at first sight a serious
reason (which on analysis may prove unsound), for giving to may
request its colloquial, optional meaning. That was the view of the
Legal Adviser to the Department of State, Green H. Hackworth, when
he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urging
ratification and stated: "Your view, Senator, is precisely in accord with
the view of the Technical Committee that prepared the draft, namely,
first, that it should be discretionary with the Council and the As-
sembly to request an opinion, and secondly, that it should be discre-
tionary with the Court to give or not to give an opinion." 42
In the United States, general rules followed in the interpretation
of private contracts are applied in construing a treaty.43 If a meaning
is doubtful or ambiguous, resort may be had to preliminary nego-
tiations,44 and even to diplomatic correspondence subsequent to the
treaty.
45
There is considerable literature on the admissibility and value of
"preparatory work" or what is called "travaux prdparatoires" in the
interpretation of treaties. Professor Hudson has dealt with this from
the viewpoint of the Permanent Court in his treatise on that body.46
Noting that the French term applies to material other than preliminary
drafts, he points out that the Permanent Court in one case expressed
a willingness to study advance instructions to representatives composing
a conference of ambassadors, and that usually preparatory work is ad-
mitted without question; that it is resorted to when the text is not suffi-
ciently clear; and even by scrutiny of preliminary drafts "to buttress
the conclusions which have been reached independently." " No matter
for what purpose or by what body the phrase may request might come
to be interpreted, it seems that because of the conflict between the or-
dinary optional meaning of may in Article 96.1 and the authority for
its being read in its context as shall, the San Francisco proceedings
42. Hearings, supra note 9, at 336.
43. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1920).
44. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
45. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 223 (1923) ; 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra note
33, at 1482.
46. HUDsON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 652, 653, 654.
47. Id. at 653; 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 1482-3; Jessup, Modernization
of the Law of International Contractual Relationships, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 378, 391
(April 1947).
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would at least be appropriately admitted in evidence. We shall con-
sider later what force would be allowed them.
Some preparatory work before San Francisco
There was preparatory work on the Charter previous to San
Francisco that would be admissible on the same principle as were
preliminary instructions to ambassadors just mentioned.
Soviet Russia had a major part in initiating the United Nations'
organization. In the Atlantic Charter (Aug. 14, '41) President Roose-
velt and Mr. Churchill had declared that disarmament is essential
"pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general
security." On December 2, '41 when Stalin and Molotov met with
General Sikorski, President of the Council of Ministers of Poland, to
discuss future relations, they announced: "After the victorious war
the task of the Allied Governments will be the securing of per-
manent and just peace. This can be achieved only through a new or-
ganization of international relations, based on the unification of demo-
cratic nations in a permanent union." Promptly the U. K.'s Foreign
Minister Eden went to Moscow, and a joint British-Soviet promotional
communique was issued December 29, '41.48
At first sight Russia's interest in joining a world organization
with bourgeois States seems inconsistent with Lenin's governing prin-
ciple often repeated by Stalin: "The existence of the Soviet Republic
side by side with the imperialist States for a long time is unthinkable.
In the end either one or the other will conquer." " But the Soviet
Union's interest in creating an international organization is made more
understandable through other highest level Soviet policy declarations
recently translated for the world's public. In the l1th edition ('45)
of Voprosy, Stalin's treatise on Soviet political strategy, he deals with
the revolutionary use of compromise and reform: "In revolutionary
tactics under a bourgeois regime, reform naturally becomes an instru-
ment for disintegrating this regime, an instrument for strengthening
revolution. . . . The revolutionary accepts reform in order to use it
as a means of meshing the legal work with the illegal (underground)
work, in order to use it as a cover for the strengthening of the illegal
work which aims at revolutionary preparation of the masses for the
overthrow of the bourgeoisie." "
The reason for Russia's initiating, and thereby obtaining leader-
ship in, the United Nations appears still more clearly in Stalin's in-
48. Hazard, Soviet Union and the United Nations, 55 YALE L.J., 1016 (1946).
49. "Historicus," Stalin on Revolution, 27 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 175, 204 (1949).
50. Id. at 197; Chakste, Soviet Concepts of the State, International Law and
Sovereignty, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 21 (Jan. 1949).
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struction on political strategy, written in 1921 and first published in
1947: that sound tactics mean "profiting by discord and every kind of
confusion in the camp of the adversary ;" "' and by his further declara-
tion that the Soviet Union is to be a base for "'linking the proletariat
of the west with the movements for national liberation from imperial-
ism in the east." In the same vein Stalin wrote in 1927: "We cannot
forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter
of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying war
with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable but which may be
delayed either until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe, or until
the colonial revolutions come fully to a head, or, finally until the capi-
talists fight among themselves over division of the colonies. Therefore,
the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an
obligatory task for us." 52 Stalin's strategic doctrine of contriving
colonial liberation movements was emphasized at the San Francisco
Conference by Mr. Molotov, then the Soviet Union's Peoples' Com-
missar for Foreign Affairs, when in a speech delivered in Russian, he
praised the prospective Charter because its purposes would appeal to
the populations of colonies and mandated territories.53 But this is
ahead of our story.
Three days after the December '41 British-Soviet communique,
the January 1, '42 Declaration of the United Nations was signed at
Washington by twenty-six nations including the Soviet Union. It
confirmed the Atlantic Charter. At Moscow on October 30, '43, the
Declaration of Four Nations, signed on behalf of the U. S. S. R.,
U. K., U. S. A. and China, pledged that after the war their "united
action . . . will be continued for the organization and maintenance
of peace and security," and recognized "the necessity of establishing
* a general international organization based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states." So Russia, strictly
for her own announced special purposes, had a place on the band-
wagon, and we can now see how she used it. The first sequel was
the October 7, '44 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals by the same four na-
tions for the form of a United Nations Charter.54
Some preparatory work at San Francisco
The San Francisco Conference began April 26 and ended June
26, '45. It was preceded by meetings in Washington, April 9-25, of
51. "Historicus," op. cit. supra note 49, at 205.
52. Id. at 206, 207.
53. Hazard, supra note 48, at 1026.
54. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 569-82.
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the United Nations Committee of Jurists to prepare a preliminary draft
of a Statute of the Court.55 The Chairman of this Committee was Mr.
Hackworth, and its Rapporteur Professor Jules Basdevant, now re-
spectively Judge and President of the International Court. The Rap-
porteur's report of April 25 did not contemplate that political organs
would decide legal questions, even tentatively."6
At San Francisco the Steering Committee " keyed the working
bodies to specified provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of
1944, and divided the Conference into four commissions: I, to handle
Preamble Purposes and Principles through Committee I/1, and
Amendment and Secretariat through Committtees I/1 and 1/2; II, to
handle the General Assembly through four committees; III, the Se-
curity Council through four committees; and IV, Judicial Organization
through two committees.58
Conference work concerning competence to interpret the Charter
in general
On May 23, Committee 11/2 referred to Committee IV/2 the
question whether the General Assembly should have exclusive com-
petence to interpret the Charter. In the latter on May 28, the acting
Chairman (Egyptian delegate) observed that interpretation is tanta-
mount to revision, and suggested that the interpreting body be the
same as that which would amend, namely, the General Assembly. The
question was referred to a new subcommittee, IV/2/B, composed of
delegates from the U. K., U. S. A., Norway, Yugoslavia, Belgium and
France.59 On June 7, '45 this subcommittee rejected Belgium's mo-
tion that conflicts between organs on the interpretation of the Charter
must be referred to the Court; and resolved that they must be disposed
of by one of three methods; (i) reference to the Court for an advisory
opinion, or (ii) submission to an ad hoc committee of jurists or (iii)
reference to a joint conference. The subcommittee's report was ap-
proved on June 12 by Committee IV/2, of which the Chairman and
Rapporteur, respectively, were delegates from Ecuador and Ethiopia.6"
No U. S. A. delegate seems to have dissented from this action.
Meanwhile, Commission I (Chairman and Rapporteur, respec-
tively, Belgian and Philippines delegates), was considering the Court's
55. Meeting of Committee of Jurists, 14 U.N. ConF. Doc. 14, 587, 648 (1945).
56. Id. at 821.
57. Sel't'd Doc's, note 10 supra, at 25-6.
58. Id. at 16-24, for Conference personnel see id. at 25-65.
59. For action of Committee H1/2, see 8 U.N. CONF. Doc. 389-92 (1945); for
that of Committee IV/2 on June 7 see Fourteenth Meeting of Committee IV/2, Doc.
No. 843, 13 U.N. CONF. Doc. 633, 645 (1945).
60. See 13 U.N. CONF. Doc. at 653, 668, 701-10 (1945).
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status from another angle.61 At its June 14 meeting the Egyptian
delegate moved that the opening paragraph on Purposes contain the
express requirement that U. N.'s measures must be "in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law." The delegate from
Panama, supporting the motion, declared: "We will not maintain
peace and security at the cost of justice." Opposed to the motion were
a British delegate, the Rapporteur of the Commission, and a U. S. A.
delegate. It was lost on a 21-21 vote.62
Conference work concerning competence to interpret the Charter's
domestic jurisdiction limitation
Up to now we have admitted "preparatory work" for possible
use in construing the Charter on whether legal questions in general
shall be referred to the Court for advisory opinions. But under both
the Covenant and the Charter one type of legal issue has towered over
all others, domestic jurisdiction. That issue is inevitably tied up with
the Soviet Union's purpose mentioned above, of promoting "national
liberation movements in Eastern colonial areas." If San Francisco
"preparatory work" on the domestic jurisdiction issue is admitted for
its possible aid in construing may request in Article 96, paragraph 1,
it would (as will later be developed) prove of questionable value for
construing the phrase contrary to its legal meaning.
Article 15, paragraph 8 of the Covenant provided that when the
dispute is claimed by a party "to arise out of a matter which by interna-
tional law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party" and
the Council so finds, it "shall make no recommendation as to its set-
tlement." Apparently the League's Council never refused or ignored a
serious request from a party to refer the domestic jurisdiction issue to
the Permanent Court, or failed to accept the Court's advisory opinion.
63
Now note the form of the Charter's Article 2, paragraph 7: "Noth-
ing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement under Chapter VII."
61. First Meeting of Commission I, Doc. No. 1006, 6 U.N. CONF. Doc. 21-33
(1945).
62. The above-described actions by Committee IV/2 and by Commission I were
after the U.S.S.R. had forced issuance of the June 7 Statement by the sponsoring
powers on the veto in the Council. (See Part III, infra.
63. HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 510-22, especially at 513; see also Briggs,
The United Nations and Political Decision of Legal Questions, PROC. AM.,. Soc'Y OF
INT'I L. 42-53 (Apr. 1948).
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Let us compare the two domestic jurisdiction paragraphs. The
Covenant's express provision that international law shall be the cri-
terion for domestic jurisdiction is absent from the Charter. In the
Covenant the Council's own finding that it was not encroaching upon
a State's domestic jurisdiction freed it for further action; the Charter
does not have any such feature. The League's Council was presumably
to request the Court's advisory opinion before making a finding, as
was done when the domestic affairs question was seriously raised. The
following travauz priparatoires at San Francisco indicate the desire
of certain countries to get away from any such practice. The meeting
on May 17, '45 of Committee I/i (Chairman and Rapporteur, re-
spectively, Ukrainian and Syrian delegates) was considering the form
of the domestic jurisdiction paragraph. A delegate suggested that such
an issue be referred by a U. N. political organ to the proposed Court.
When another delegate challenged this view, the Chairman announced
the discussion closed until receipt of a report from the drafting sub-
committee, i. e., Subcommittee I/i/A.64 The subcommittee's Rap-
porteur in reports on June 1 and 13 recommended the form of a domes-
tic jurisdiction paragraph to be inserted as paragraph 7 in Article 2
in exactly the form finally adopted, just quoted above. At Committee
I/I's June 14 meeting, when the Subcommittee's report was being con-
sidered, the delegate from Greece moved the following amendment to
Article 2: "It should be left to the International Court of Justice at the
request of a party to decide whether or not such situation or dispute
arises out of matters that under international law fall within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of the State concerned." Delegates of Peru and
"of many of the South American countries" supported the motion."'
The Belgian delegate moved that the domestic jurisdiction paragraph
be amended so that, like the corresponding paragraph in the Covenant,
U. N. could not intervene except "in matters which . . . are according
to international law exclusively (or solely) within the jurisdiction of
any State."
The Committee's Chairman, Mr. Manuilsky, suggested that con-
sideration of both motions for amendment would be greatly facilitated
if Mr. J. F. Dulles of the United States delegation would explain the
sense of the proposed form of the paragraph. This was, as will be
seen, 5a a few days after the U. S. A., the U. K. and China had
succumbed to pressure from Moscow on the interpretation of the
64. Eighth Meeting of Committee I/1, Doc. No. 423, 6 U.N. CONF. Doc. 310-11
(1945).
65. Seventeenth Meeting of Committee I/1, Doc. No. 1019, 6 U.N. CoNF. Doc.
509 (1945).
65a. Text between notes 83-97, infra.
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veto power in Security Council voting. According to the Rapporteur's
minutes, Mr. Dulles was speaking for the five Governments then
sponsoring the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. He explained that the
concept of the domestic jurisdiction paragraph had changed because of
changes in the character of the Organization as visualized to date in
the San Francisco Conference, especially in the function of the U. N.
for eliminating the underlying causes of war."8 Referring to the con-
tention that domestic jurisdiction should be determined in accordance
with international law (Committee minutes): "Mr. Dulles again
pointed out that international law was subject to constarit change and
therefore escaped definition. It would in any case be difficult to define
whether or not a given situation came within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of a State. In this era the whole internal life of a country was
affected by foreign conditions. He did not consider that it would be
practicable to provide that the World Court determine the limitations
of domestic jurisdiction or that it should be called upon to give ad-
visory opinions since some countries would probably not accept the
compulsory jurisdiction clause." 87 Opposing the Greek delegate's mo-
tion for amendment, Mr. Dulles suggested that further questions could
arise in connection with other articles of Chapter 2: "Shall it be the
Court or the Council? Somebody would have to determine questions
such as this. The Committees of Commission IV had been studying
this very type of problem, but they were not prepared to say that all
matters of this kind should be referred to the International Court for
settlement." Under the two-thirds rule, a vote of 17 to 14 lost the
Greek amendment.
A vote was then taken on the Belgian proposal expressly to in-
corporate international law as the criterion for domestic jurisdiction.
The Committee is reported as having approved without formal vote
the draft excluding the proposed Belgian amendment."8
Five days later, June 19, Subcommittee I/i/A's draft of the do-
mestic jurisdiction paragraph, having been informally approved by
66. Id. at 508.
67. By the end of 1947 twenty-seven states had accepted compulsory jurisdiction,
GOODRICH AND HAM RO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 480; and five more states a year
later; Hudson, The Twenty-Seventh Year of World Court, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 16
(1949). Reservations qualified some of these acceptances. Id. at 19; Hudson, The
Twenty-Sixth Year of the World Court, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 10 (1948); Hudson,
The Twenty-Fifth Year of the World Court, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 9 (1941); Hyde,
The United States Accepts the Optional Clause, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 778 (1946);
Preuss, Tie International Court of tistice, The Senate, and Matters of Domestic
Jurisdiction, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 720 (1946); Wilcox, The United States Accepts
Compulsory Jurisdiction, 40 Am. J. INTI L. 699 (1946). Some of the non-accepting
states, for instance, Greece and Peru, had vainly fought in committees for a court
with the required advisory function and for international law as its express criterion
on the domestic jurisdictional issue.
68. 6 U.N. CONF. Doc. 509, 512 (1945).
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Committee I/1, was submitted for final action by Commission I. Its
minutes do not indicate any vote on the form of the domestic jurisdic-
tion paragraph.6 9
If the episode just reviewed should be used as an aid in construing
may request in 96.1, Mr. Dulles' speech should be appraised from the
viewpoints of its effect on the vote and of the merits of his argument.
First, of the 14 votes against the Greek resolution in Committee I/1,
at least three were presumably cast by the Russian bloc which, by its
own announced over-all world strategy (in the Russian tongue and
then mostly hidden from the West), was motivated by intentions wholly
irrelevant to the Charter's basic purposes. 70 Four out of the remaining
eleven votes recorded against the Greek resolution were therefore re-
sponsible for the decision of Committee I/1. Mr. Dulles' argument
may well have swung these four pivotal votes cast by delegates pre-
sumably otherwise free to choose such status for the Court and interna-
tional law under the Charter as might seem to them desirable. When
Chairman Manuilsky introduced Mr. Dulles to make his address just
before the voting, it was hardly his purpose to promote a two-thirds
vote in favor of the Greek and Belgian amendments.
Secondly, Mr. Dulles was curiously out of step with foremost legal
authorities when he insisted that International Law's definition of do-
mestic jurisdiction is too vague. The line has been clear and straight
from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson's letter of 1793 to the French
Minister 71 through Chief Justice Marshall's opinion of 1812 for the
Supreme Court in Schooner Exchidnge v. McFadden,72 on down to the
present time. Whether the concept has been the basis of "national
jurisdiction" 71 or "supremacy of the territorial sovereign," or has been
dealt with in connection with neutrality acts,74 it has been subject to
qualification only by the equally consistent principle that a State, by
agreement or treaty, can waive or surrender its sovereignty, partly or
wholly.
75
Both the negative restraint of domestic jurisdiction and the con-
tractual act by which a State can waive that restraint were applied by
the League's Permanent Court in a way wholly consistent with the long
line of authority above indicated. The Permanent Court's Advisory
69. See Sel't'd Doc's, supra note 10, at 562.
70. See text supra at notes 48-53.
71. 2 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 362 (1906).
72. 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812) ; 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 71, at 4.
73. Black Sea Treaty of Paris of 1856. 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 71, at 18.
74. 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 636 (1940) (acting Secretary
of State Phillips' 1936 letter to consulates in Spain).
75. 2 HACKWORTH, Op. cit. supra note 74, at 12; 1 HACKWORTH, op. Cit. supra
note 74, at 51; 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 71, at 19; 1 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 33,
at 733.
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Opinion No. 4 of February 7, '23 on The Tunis-Morocco Nationality
Decrees dealt with the dispute between France and Great Britain as to
whether the nationality decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco (French
Zone) in '21 applied to British subjects.7" France maintained that the
matter was solely in its own domestic jurisdiction under Article 15,
paragraph 8 of the Covenant; Great Britain that its international
treaties with Tunis and Morocco before they became French protec-
torates rendered the matter international. The Court declared: "The
question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the juris-
diction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon
the development of international relations;" that nationality matters
are in principle domestic but can be rendered international by treaty;
if they are, however, the international law question would still remain
whether the State had the right under the treaty to adopt the measure
complained of, such question being beyond the scope of the reference
to the Court. The Court held further that since treaties about whose
interpretation the party States differed were involved, the matter was
subject to international law, not domestic jurisdiction.
In Mr. Dulles' opinion the principle of domestic jurisdiction, as
applied by the Court, would too narrowly restrict the broad new pur-
poses of the United Nations. Britain's international law authority,
Professor H. Lauterpacht, commenting in 1931 on the Permanent
Court's opinion in the Tunis-Morocco case, said, on the contrary: "The
effect of the opinion of the Court . . . is such that in the future no
State will invoke with any hope of success the domestic jurisdiction
clause unless the opponent openly admits that his demand is not based
on international law. The Court apparently realized the sweeping im-
plications of its opinion. It tried to limit them by stating that, in
order to render the (domestic jurisdiction) exception of Article 15 (8)
inapplicable, it is not enough to invoke international engagements or
rules of international law, but that the Court must by a provisional
examination satisfy itself that the treaties and rules thus invoked have
a bearing on the dispute." 77
Commenting also on the Tunis-Morocco decision, Dr. L. Oppen-
helm, Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of
Cambridge, said: "The Opinion of the Court demonstrates that the
wider International Law extends its scope, the narrower will the re-
served national domain become. Apart from the natural process of
extension of that scope, a strong tendency in the same direction re-
76. 1 HuDsoN, WORLD COURT REPORTS 145 (1934).
77. BuTLR AND MAccoDY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATioNAL LAW 85 (rev.
ed. 1934).
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suits from the increasing practice of regulating by treaty matters which
were formerly exclusively national." 78
Professor J. Llewelyn Davies, Head, Department of Law, Uni-
versity College of Wales, in a paper before the Grotius Society in '46,
expressed regret that the Covenant's formula for domestic jurisdiction
had been abandoned in the Charter where international law is not
referred to: "The meaning of the League formula had been clearly de-
fined by the Permanent Court of International Justice and had come
to be generally understood"; further, "The Permanent Court in ex-
plaining the old formula showed that the distinction was essentially
a relative one depending upon the development of international rela-
tionships." "
Also differing from Mr. Dulles is Professor Philip C. Jessup (now
Ambassador). In January '45 he wrote: "One weakness in paragraph
7 of Section A [of Ch. VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals] is
that it seems to exclude judicial consideration of the issue whether a
particular matter is 'by international law . . solely within the do-
mestic jurisdiction.' Yet no more clearly justiciable a category of
issues could be conceived. The Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice made an admirable analysis of the problem in its Advisory Opinion
on the French nationality decrees in Tunis and Morocco." "o
There seems to be little support for Mr. Dulles' pessimistic ap-
praisal of international law, or of the court decisions, with respect to
domestic jurisdiction. We can now hazard an interpretation of his
address and of the reaction to it in both Committee I/i and Commis-
sion I. As indicated above in Part I, the Charter contradicts itself. It
is ambivalent. While vowing it will ne'er consent to intervention in a
State's domestic affairs, it consents unless the Charter's check in Ar-
ticle 2, paragraph 7, is seriously invoked. When Mr. Dulles spoke,
the movement in the Conference for freeing U. N.'s political powers
from legal restraint had carried the committees beyond the pattern of
action set by Dumbarton Oaks.8 The Soviet delegation, according to
Soviet official declarations quoted above, could not have been opposed
to Charter features that would make for instability and confusion in
78. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 94 (6th ed., rev. 1948).
79. 32 GRonus SOCIETY TRANSACTIONs 64 (1947). Confirming Professor Davies'
view, see Chakste, Justice and Law in the Charter of the United Nations, 42 Am. J.
INT'L L. 590 (1948).
80. The Court as an Orqan of the United Nations, 23 FOR. AFFAIRS 233, 238
(1945). In 18 DEP'T STATE BULL. 259 at 266 (1948) the then Legal Adviser (now
Ambassador), Ernest- A. Gross, in an able monograph said that donestic matter is
"a relative concept dependent upon the development of international relations." This
suggests that the concept presents a clear legal limitation with liberal flexibility for
adjusting to international arrangements. But see Note, 47 COL. L. REv. 268 (1947).
81. See GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1. at 111-12.
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the U. N. The U. K. naturally dislikes constitutional judicial re-
straint, and may well have feared that the Court might fail to give
full effect to a State's contractual waiver of its domestic jurisdiction.
So it can be assumed that the U. S. A. delegation, under orders to
hold the Conference together at all hazards,"2 had reluctantly made
concessions to its Big Five associates from its traditional preference
for international law controls through a court, and that Mr. Dulles as
diplomat was carrying through those concessions. This assumption is
confirmed by the statement of Professor Henry Reiff, a member of the
U. S. A. delegation's technical staff of legal experts for advising Com-
mittee IV/2. On April 23, '48, speaking at the annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law, he referred to the strong op-
position in the Committee from foreign experts hostile to judicial re-
view; also to their jealous attachment "to the new powers" as part of
the Security Council's autonomy, adding: "Mr. Golunsky, the Russian
representative, was very eager that the unfolding of those powers, the
development of those powers, should not be restricted by premature
or unnecessarily frequent appeals to a court for the definition of those
powers, and most of the members of the Committee felt the same way.
We ourselves did not urge judicial review as such or any monopoly
of review by the Court over the acts of the several coordinate organs.
Some of the South American delegations suggested that, but it was
evident in their suggestion that probably they were more interested in
a delimitation of the authority of the Security Council than they were
in setting up a doctrine of judicial review." 83
To smaller nations which had built high hopes for their own
safety under the U. N. upon international law standards of justice,
the views of the Big Five given by Mr. Dulles seemed sinister. They
were alarmed by his reasons: distrust of international law and of the
Court. Their reported protests in committee indicate that they feared
the leaders of the victorious minority, not as self-declared men of little
faith, but as representatives of great Powers bent upon license to inter-
fere with their internal affairs.
82. See Part III and note 94, infra, in connection with the veto. GoODRICH AND
HAM BRO, O p. cit. supra note 1, at 17. The authors, both active participants at San
Francisco, suggest the duress exerted there "since the members of the Conference,
when faced with the possibility that a particular decision would be unacceptable to
one of the Sponsoring Governments and might for that reason prevent it from joining
the Organization [U.N.], did not find it expedient to force the issue and accept the
consequences." The "Sponsoring Government" could not be other than the Soviet
Union.
83. PROc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 80-1 (1948). Professor Reiff's remarks dovetail
into the Legal Adviser's July '45 statement about the view of the Technical Committee
which prepared the draft of the Charter (see text at note 42, supra).
308 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Conference work at San Francisco concerning the formula for voting
in the Security Council
The Charter itself counteracts the committee decisions, just re-
viewed above, aimed at excluding international law as the basis for
the Court's decisions. The Statute of the Court, "an integral part"
(Art. 92) of the Charter, provides in Article 38: "The Court,
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international con-
ventions . . (b) international custom . . . (c) the general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations; . . " The Statute's
Article 68 directs: "In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court
shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which
apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to
be applicable." The Statute's express preservation of international law
as guide for the Court probably accounts for what we shall now see:
the Soviet Union's other attempts, by action both during and since the
adoption of the Charter, to prevent the Council from requesting the
Court for advisory opinions.
The gravest frustration of the Charter's purpose is due to at-
tempted distortion of the meaning of procedural matters in Article 27
which governs voting in the Security Qouncil. Indeed, this insistence
upon a twisted meaning for the phrase is the chief reason why the
Council has never asked the Court for advice. Chapter VI, Section C,
was the one point left blank in the October 7, '44 Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals; the sponsors simply noted that the question "is still under
consideration." " To fill this blank, President Roosevelt at the Feb-
ruary '45 Crimean Conference at Yalta proposed to Churchill and
Stalin the draft of a voting formula which they accepted for insertion
as Section C. 'Incorporated by the four sponsoring powers into their
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Section C was later adopted by the San
Francisco Conference verbatim as Article 27 of the Charter, as follows:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall
be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article
52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
84. 11 DE'T STATE BULL. 370 (1944).
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The meaning of procedural matters could not have been misun-
derstood by any of the three parties at Yalta, or by China when she
agreed to the voting formula a few days later. In Anglo-American
and most other legal systems procedural refers to the machinery, as
distinguished from the principles, of justice, e. g., a forum has before
it a procedural matter when considering, say, whether to take juris-
diction of a dispute, or to ask a court's advisory opinion on a legal
question connected with it, or refers a question of fact or law to a
Special Master, or a question of fact to a jury, or orders a change of
venue to another tribunal. Any such action is part of procedure be-
cause it does not deal with substantive rights.8" In Continental Roman
or Civil law and in the Soviet Union the same word procedure and
its related word process are used. 8
The following circumstances confirm the Soviet Union's concur-
rence at Yalta in this established meaning of procedural matters: For
several years preceding December '39 it had been a member of the
League, but had not accepted the League's invitation to subscribe to
the Statute of the Court.8 7  It had been invited by the Court to be-
come a party to a specific dispute but had declined to do so.88  The
parties at Yalta agreed that, in accordance with the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals of October '44,89 a new organization to maintain peace and
security was to be established along the lines of the League Covenant,
its court to be constituted under either the League's Statute of the
Permanent Court or a new statute based upon itY° The Soviet Union
had been represented at Dumbarton Oaks by a delegation of ten
under the Chairmanship of Mr. Gromyko." It was thus quite familiar
with Chapter III of the Statute of the Permanent Court entitled Pro-
cedure, which prescribed the old Court's machinery and provided in
Article 50: "The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body,
bureau, commission or other organization that it may select with the
task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion." Chap-
85. 34 WORDS AND PHRASES 75-79; 21 C.J.S. 33, 266-274; General Investment
Co. v. N.Y.C.R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 228 (1926); ENGLISH AND EmPiRE DIGEST 264-9,
374. 446-62, 985-8 (Supp. 1932).
86. E.g., CODE CIVIL ANNoTL (Fusier-Hernzan 1935-49), and CODE DE PRO-
CEDURE CIVILE (45th ed. Paris, 1948); NEUNER, PRIVATRECHT AND PROCESSRECHT
(Mannheim, 1935); DE PINA, PRCINCIIOS DE DEMECHO PROCESAL CIVIL (Mexico D.F.,
1940) ; PERETEVSKU, OCHERKI SOUDOUSTROISTRA I GRAZDANSKOGO PROTSESSA IN
OSTRANNYKH GOSUDARST (Outline of Court Organization and Civil Procedure in
Foreign Countries) (Moscow, 1938); RICARD, CODE DE PROCADURE CIVILE (REVISL)
DR LA RLPUBLIQUE CHINOISE (Tiensin, 1936).
87. Hudson, The Members of The League of Nations, 16 BRIT. Y. B. OF INT'L L.
130, 144 (1935) ; HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 127-128, 217, 666-7.
88. Status of Eastern Carelia, P.C.I.J. Sec. B, No. 5 at 7-20 (1923).
89. 12 DEP'T STATE BULL. 368-76 (1945).
90. Id. at 370.
91. Id. at 174.
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ter III of U. N.'s Statute of the International Court carries the same
heading and contains the identical Article 50 of its prototype. So the
Soviet Union seems to have plainly agreed at Yalta in February '45
that the Council's request for an advisory opinion would be a pro-
cedural matter under the voting formula. In its later actions at San
Francisco, it confirmed the true meaning of the phrase through ap-
proval of the Statute, but at the same time (as we shall now see) was
attempting to distort that meaning in the voting formula.
In mid-May '45, Committee III/1 (Chairman and Rapporteur,
respectively, Greek and El Salvador delegates), created subcommittee
III/I/B to clarify the Yalta formula. The subcommittee on May 22
submitted to the sponsoring governments twenty-three categories of
matters and asked whether in their opinion these were procedural and
thus to be decided by any seven Council votes or were non-procedural
and subject to veto by one permanent Member. One question was:
Is a request to the Court for an advisory opinion a procedural matter? 92
On June 7 the five sponsoring governments (then including France)
issued a Statement on interpreting proposed Article 27 (the Yalta
voting formula)."' It did not answer the subcommittee's question just
mentioned. It stated 11b that the Council's decisions are non-procedural
and subject to veto by one permanent Member if they "involve its
taking direct measures under Chapter VIII (of the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals) all the way from mediatory adjustment of a situation that
might lead to a dispute to a decision that there is a threat to the peace
or that force shall be used to suppress a breach of the peace. The
Statement 93' pointed out in effect that some kinds of Council action
which might ordinarily be regarded as procedural, such as deciding to
investigate or sending a commission of inquiry, could "initiate a chain
of events" leading to major political consequences and should therefore
be regarded as non-procedural and subject to the veto; that accordingly
procedural matters which any seven Council Members can decide should
be confined to decisions under Chapter IV, Section D, of the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals, specifically: matters concerning the Council's rules of
procedure; its method for selecting its President; its rules for function-
ing; its times and places of meetings; by what agencies its functions
shall be performed; and its invitation to interested Members or any
other State to participate in discussions; and that (part II, paragraph
92. 9 U.N. CONF. Doc. 699-709 (1945).
93a. 6 Id. at 710-14. This is reproduced with a helpful discussion in GooDRC H
AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 210-15; Lee, The Genesis of the Veto, I INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 33-42 (1947).
93b. 6 U.N. CONF. Doc. 710 (1945), Part I, paragraph 1.
93c. Id. at paragraphs 4 and 5.
U. N. BY-PASSES INTERNATIONAL COURT
2) even the question whether a matter is procedural could not be
brought up for a vote in the Council over the objection of one per-
manent Member. This definition would leave the Council's request to
the Court a non-procedural matter subject to the unitary veto.
Russia forced the Statement on its four co-sponsors. Secretary
of State Stettinius took the extreme step of going over the head of Mr.
Molotov, Chief of the Soviet Union's delegation, to have Presidential
Representative Hopkins in Moscow appeal personally to Stalin to relax
the Russian delegations demands.94 Later, in Part IV, we can see
whether U. S. S. R. has lived up to its assurance in paragraph 8 of the
Statement: "It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent mem-
bers, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their
'veto' power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council."
The Statement was never approved by any subcommittee, com-
mittee, or commission, or by the Conference itself. 5 The Soviet Union
has admitted that it binds only the five sponsoring powers.9 Yet in
the U. N. Security Council the Soviet Union, relying on that State-
ment, has since at will paralyzed any effective action on most matters,
including any proposal that it refer a legal question to the Court. In-
deed a mere intimation that Russia would oppose such a proposal has
on more than one occasion prevented any motion for such reference
as a futile gesture.1
7
We have now seen the main San Francisco Conference actions
relevant to this discussion: actions in which the Soviet bloc appears
as the main force aimed at excluding international law as a criterion
and the International Court as U. N.'s adviser; and proposals by the
Big Five, on pressure from Russia, but never adopted by the Con-
ference, for distorting the plain meaning of procedural -matters in order
to enable one permanent Member of the Security Council to prevent
most kinds of procedural action including a request to the Court for
advice. We can now look at some of the situations and disputes since
handled in both political organs of U. N. in which those attempted
exclusions and distorted meanings have been used to thwart the real
purposes of the Charter.
94. In this way Mr. Molotov's reluctant consent was obtained to according pro-
cedural status to the question of placing a matter on the council's agenda, see STUART,
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, c. 33 (1949),. Mr. Stuart refers to an essentially similar
account by James F. Byrnes in SPEAKING FRANKLY, 64-5 (1947).
95. See GOODRICH AND HAMaRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 220. The authors say it
was made clear during the discussion that this course of avoiding any vote or other
action on the statement was deliberately followed in order not to have Members of
the Conference other than the sponsoring powers feel bound by the expression of the
latters' views.
96. See Padelford, The Use of the Veto, II INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 227
(1948).
97. See for instance text infra, at note 113 et seq.
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IV. SAN FRACCISCO MOVES TO LAKE SUCCESS
Naturally the dominant men and ideas of San Francisco carried
over to Lake Success. Neither U. N.'s Security Council nor its Assem-
bly, nor any other organ or subordinate agency, has yet asked the Court
for advice in a situation where peace was threatened or remotely in-
volved."'
Legal questions raised in the Security Council where situations
could endanger peace have had to do chiefly with the issue of domestic
jurisdiction. Of the dozen or so important cases of that kind in the
Council, 9 the following selected ones reflect the inevitably mounting
disorder when political bodies reject the steadying touch of legal prin-
ciple:
(a) In the Spanish situation, brought to the Council in April '46
on motion of the Polish delegate, there were proposals for drastic
action. The proponents argued that although the Franco regime's
acts were domestic, the Council's action was called for by their po-
tential threat to international peace. The Soviet Union insisted that
the proposals were inadequate; that the threat to peace was actual; and
that the Council order its Members to terminate relations with Spain..
The Council withheld action.100
(b) In December '46 in the Greek appeal against guerrilla action
by Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia, the Council's Committee re-
ported that actual threat to international peace neutralized the domestic
jurisdiction obstacle which the Soviet bloc had urged as a bar to action
by the Council. A resolution offered by the U. S. A. delegation for
giving effect to the Committee's report received 9 votes for to 2 against,
which latter included that of the Soviet Union; so the resolution was
ruled as lost under Article 27's unitary veto.10'
(c) In the Indonesian matter the Netherlands Government re-
peatedly raised the issue of domestic jurisdiction and asked that the
question of the Security Council's competence be referred to the Court
for an advisory opinion. The Soviet Union through Mr. Manuilsky
98. The Assembly's Oct. 22, 1949 decision (see text supra, at notes 6-7) is no
exception, as the Mindszenty and other trials in Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania did
not threaten or involve international peace; GooDRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note
1, at 68. An illuminating discussion, covering more developments in U.N. political
organs than are dealt with below is Goodrich, The United Nations and Donestic
Jurisdiction, III INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 14 (1949).
99. An informative account covering some early instances perforce omitted from
this condensed review is-Professor Padelford's The Use of the Veto, supra note 96.
100. Journal of the Security Council, Nos. 28, 29, 37, 39, 40 (1946) ; also GooD-
RICH AND HAMBRO, op. Cit. supra note 1, at 60.
101. Journal of the Security Council, No. 25 at 563 et seq. (1946) ; also text and
citations in GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 60-1.
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had originally brought Indonesian matters before the Council in '46
when British troops were in Java at the request of the Netherlands.
The U. K. through Mr. Bevin had then offered the domestic Juris-
diction plea, which was vigorously attacked by the Soviet representa-
tive.10 2 The matter was dropped in February '46. The later Security
Council phase of the Indonesian problem was brought on in July '47
by Australian and Indian appeals. As in '46, the Soviet bloc led the
opposition to referring the domestic jurisdiction issue to the Court.
The request for such reference, although supported by the U. S. A.,
U. K., France and Belgium, was voted down in 1947.103 The Coun-
cil's subsequent actions assumed its own competence without a vote.
As will be recalled, Mr. Evatt at San Francisco had warned the
Conference that if the Charter should enable a threat to peace to over-
ride a State's domestic jurisdiction safeguard, this would be "almost
an invitation to use or threaten force in any dispute arising out of a
matter of domestic jurisdiction in the hope of inducing the Security
Council to extort concessions from the State that is threatened." 104
Mr. Evatt was not far wrong. When the crucial meetings of the Se-
curity Council for dealing with the Netherlands plea of domestic juris-
diction had been set for late January '49, a conference of nineteen
Asiatic nations was summoned by India at New Delhi for January 20.105
Some of those attending were official representatives to U. N. The
January 23 resolutions of the New Delhi Conference, cabled to Lake
Success in time to give the decisive blow to the Netherlands plea of
domestic jurisdiction, declared emphatically that continued hostilities
in Indonesia endangered the peace of Southeast Asia, and then dic-
tated a set of terms which the Security Council should put into effect.10 6
These resolutions reached the pages of the metropolitan press directly
from New Delhi. Concurrent press interviews by Asiatic leaders
emanating from New Delhi expansively suggested that the conference
was a demonstration of Asia's solid opposition to "colonialism" in
general and might be the forerunner of collective or bloc action by
Asia against the West.10 7 The New Delhi resolutions, perfectly timed,
dominated the subsequent and final debate and action in the Security
Council, which ignored-this, time under the leadership of U. S. A.
and U. K. delegates-the Dutch plea that the legal question af the
102. Journal of the Security Council, No. 11 at 197 (1946); GOODRICH AND
HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 59.
103. Journal of the Security Council, No. 67 at 1645 (1946).
104. See note 37 supra.
105. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1949, § 4, p. ES, col. 9; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 20,
1949, p. 14, col. 2.
106. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1949, p. 3, col. 2 (full text).
107. Id. at 1.
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Council's competence be referred to the Court. On the stated ground
of international friction and threats to peace, the Council adopted reso-
lutions of an unprecedented severity, including some of the New Delhi
formula, directed toward compelling the Dutch to concede vital native
demands.' The Dutch who for at least thirty years had been building
toward dominion government in the East Indies, and had through the
Queen in December '42 pledged it publicly to the natives,1°9 were thus
forced, at a new disadvantage, into negotiations with the native revo-
lutionary movement, whose long-standing alliance with Communism,
mentioned by the Dutch in earlier debates, had been again described
in the Council by the Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. van Royen. The
sequent negotiations between the Dutch and the native Republican
organization have since resulted in agreement on a plan for the United
States of Indonesia far more prejudicial to the Dutch than was con-
templated by the 1948 Renville Agreement which a U. N. commission
had formulated and promoted." 0
While those delicate negotiations under chaperonage of the Se-
curity Council's Commission were proceeding in Batavia (to be later
continued in the Hague), the Soviet Union bloc started a movement
to open up the entire Indonesian question in the General Assembly.
In the ad hoc committee handling the matter, the vote on May 10, '49
was 42 (including that of the U. S. A.) to 6 for deferring in the As-
sembly any further consideration of the Indonesian question pending
those negotiations. The six votes against the resolution were all cast
by the Soviet bloc."' Next day in the General Assembly the ad hoc
committee's report and resolution were up for action. There was the
same line-up of forces. The U. S. A. again urged deferment. Am-
bassador Austin, its Chief Delegate, answering attacks from the Soviet
bloc, said in part: "The Soviet group of States has never paid more
than lip service to the principles of the United Nations in connexion
with the Indonesian question. From the very beginning they have
acted in such a way as to bring about political and economic disorder
in Indonesia. Does the Soviet Union want an independent Indo-
nesia? Its conduct indicates that it wants an Indonesia under the
108. S/PV 406, Jan. 28, 1949.
109. FURNIVALL, NETHERLANDS INDIA, Ch. VIII, IX (1944). For Queen Wil-
helmina's Pledge, The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia, NETHERLANDS
INFORmATION BURE-Au 38 (Oct. 1947).
110. See, for Ambassador van Royen's account of communist activity in East
Indies, Journal of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 132 at 7-21. For Renville
Agreement of Jan. 17, 1948, Security Council Doc. S/649; for United States of Indo-
nesia agreements of Nov. 2, 1949, see Commission's Special Report (in general terms)
to Security Council Nos. 10, 1949, S/1417; also official Security Council Docs. giving
full terms: Appendices to the Special Report, etc. S/14/7/Add. 1 (Nov. 14, 1949).
111. A/AC, May 10 '49, 24/SR 52.
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domination and control of a Communist authority taking its orders from
Moscow." The resolution for approval of the ad hoc committee's report
and for deferment by the Assembly of further consideration of the
Indonesian matter was adopted by 37 votes, with 14 abstentions. 2
(d) Even this study of documents has its lighter moments. The
Czechoslovak question was raised in the Security Council in March
'48 at the complaint of Chile on the ground that the Soviet Union
by its Prague coup had violated Czechoslovak political sovereignty and
independence in contravention of the Charter's Article 2, paragraph
7.1' The Soviet Union, opposing any action by the Council, declared
that the matter was one of domestic jurisdiction, since a change in
government is a domestic matter even when brought about through ac-
tion of a foreign power.1 4 This rendering of the domestic affairs con-
cept was surely an original contribution. According to the minutes,
the U. S. A.'s proposal in the Council to appoint a committee to take
evidence and report on what had happened in Czechoslovakia was then
smothered by the announcement of "a permanent member" that it
would vote against it.
So much for the Security Council. The unitary veto is confined
to the Council; it does not apply to voting in the General Assembly, in
the Economic and Social Council, or other political U. N. bodies and
agencies. In the Assembly, States have, in ten or so notable instances,
moved for its requesting the Court's opinion. A few are of special
interest.
(a) India's complaint about discriminatory practices against resi-
dents of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa has been pending
in the Assembly since '46. In December '46, the Assembly voted down
South Africa's request that the questiof of the Assembly's competence
in South Africa's domestic affairs be referred to the International
Court. In the debate the Soviet delegates were the chief supporters
of the Indians. The Assembly avoided any express decision on its own
competence, but its subsequent resolutions have assumed its authority
to act. In one it took the position that a State's treatment of its na-
tionals is not necessarily within its domestic jurisdiction if friendly
relations between States are impaired." 5 On May 14, '49 the Assembly
invited India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa to a round-
table conference,""6 but has not since taken any conclusive action.
112. A/PV 208, May 11, 1949, at 17, 71-5.
113. S/PV 272, March 22, 1948; S/PV 276, March 31, 1948; S/PV 278, April
6, 1948; also GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 64.
114. Mr. Gromyko, for U.S.S.R., and Mr. Tarasenko, for Ukrainian S.S.R..
S/PV 268, March 17, 1948, at 11-13, and 36-40.
115. First Session, Doc. A/64/Add. 1.
116. A/900, May 31, 1949, at 6.
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(b) In the Korean matter pending in the Assembly since '46-'47,
the Soviet Union (dominant in Northern Korea) contested, on the
score of domestic jurisdiction, the Assembly's competence to observe
elections through a commission. The resolution to do this was carried,
but the Soviet Union physically blocked the Commission's efforts in
Northern Korea..
7
(c) At the request of Chile in May '48 the General Assembly con-
sidered the action of the Soviet Union in preventing Russian wives of
foreign nationals from leaving the country. It was claimed that this
constituted a violation of fundamental human rights and other prin-
ciples of the Charter. The Soviet Union representative in June '48
declared, among other things, that to place the question on the Assem-
bly's agenda would constitute a violation of the domestic jurisdiction
paragraph of the Charter. The Assembly's Sixth Committee rejected
the proposal to ask the International Court's advisory opinion on the
legal question so raised; and then, assuming the Assembly's competence,
it submitted to it a draft resolution declaring that the Soviet Union's
measures were contrary to the Charter, etc., and recommending that
the Soviet Union withdraw them. The Assembly adopted the draft
resolution April 25, '49.11s The matter is still pending.
(d) Bolivia in March '49 proposed that the criminal court pro-
ceedings of Hungary against Cardinal Mindszenty and of Bulgaria
against other ecclesiastical persons be placed on the General Assem-
bly's agenda. Hungary and Bulgaria, strongly supported by the Soviet
Union, promptly objected on the score of domestic jurisdiction. Sec-
onders of Bolivia's proposal answered that in the peace treaties of the
victorious Allied and Associated powers with all three Balkan States,
the pledges of the latter to preserve human rights and fundamental
freedoms must transcend any domestic character of the acts complained
of. On April 30, '49, following several turbulent sessions both in the
Assembly and in its ad hoc political committee, the Assembly adopted a
resolution placing the matter upon its agenda for its fourth session.
Subsequently Rumania's action in court proceedings was joined with
those of Hungary and Bulgaria on the Assembly's agenda. On Octo-
ber 22, '49 the Assembly voted to request the International Court for
an advisory opinion on some legal issues involved." 9
117. For resolution, Second Session, Doc. A/519; and for summary, GOODRICH
AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 170-1.
118. A/842, April 25, 1949.
119. See for action on resolution, A/PV 203, April 30, 1949; for joinder, recital
in Assembly's Oct. 22, 1949, Resolution, Doc. A/1043; for documentation of Assembly's
Request, see note 7 supra.
U. N. BY-PASSES INTERNATIONAL COURT
The Assembly's resolution recites that the Charter's purpose under
Article 55 is to promote universal observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, that the three defeated States have rejected
charges of treaty violations, and that they have refused to join in ap-
pointing commissions for settling disputes pursuant to the treaties;
that under the treaties such refusal would authorize U. N.'s Secretary
General on a party's request to appoint a third member to such a
treaty commission, if the other party fails to agree upon him; and that
it is important for the Secretary General to have advice on the scope
of his authority. The resolution then recites the Assembly's decision
to ask the Court, first, do the diplomatic exchanges between parties to
the treaties disclose disputes subject to provisions for settlement of
disputes under those treaties; second, are the three States obligated to
appoint representatives to the treaty commissions; third, if so, and
if one does not appoint such a representative, has the Secretary Gen-
eral authority to appoint him; and fourth, would a commission so con-
stituted be competent to make a binding decision? The application to
the Court, registered Nov. 9, '49, is strictly within the terms of the
resolution. 20
So far as its resolution and its formal request to the Court go,
the Assembly's competence to deal with any aspect of the disputes is
not brought into issue, but the diplomatic correspondence when filed
and answering pleadings, if any, could broaden the issues and present
the question of domestic jurisdiction. Thus the new Court might have
occasion to deal for the first time with the impact of treaty obligations
upon matters primarily domestic. Charter obligations could not be
involved on this point unless on the possible ground (analogous to
the "piercing of the corporate veil" between holding companies and
their subsidiaries) that, although the three States are not members of
U. N., they are to be held to the Charter since the Soviet Union, a
member, controls them. If the Court's opinion should deal with the
domestic jurisdiction issue, this would, for reasons presently given,
hardly affect the handling of that issue in some later possible case in
the Security Council. In connection with that issue, the Court might
appraise the effect, if any, of the San Francisco proceedings upon in-
terpretation of the Charter's Article 2, paragraph 7. It seems that
such an appraisal would almost certainly affect subsequent action in
the Assembly, but that any reaction in the council could be delayed
indefinitely.
120. C.I.J. General List No. 8.
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V. THE COURT AND U. N.'s FUTURE
This brings us t@ a new question about the use of the San Fran-
cisco preparatory work by the International Court in construing the
Charter, whether in the Bulgaria-Hungary-Rumania case or in some
other. In the light of precedent in the Permanent Court and generally
in Anglo-American and Continental jurisprudence, the preparatory
work would be admitted in evidence.'' But would it be allowed to
have weighty Would it even be used? The whole rationale of using
travaux priparatoires when searching for the intention of doubtful
language in a treaty or statute rests on the premise that, although the
interests of the framers may have been at odds, all intended the docu-
ment to express a common denominator of purpose. Would the Court
allow committee decisions at San Francisco to affect the plain mean-
ings of the Charter's words if it should be demonstrated that the deci-
sions had been forced mainly by the Soviet Union, whose aim and
strategy have been to exploit the Charter for undermining and destroy-
ing that very international peace which is its goal, and for facilitating
the destruction of other U. N. States? Would not the Court be com-
pelled to interpret the Charter's words according to their established
meanings and in terms of its declared purposes, and to ignore Con-
ference decisions and interpretations inconsistent with them when trace-
able to such hostile strategy?
Another point on the use of travaux priparatoires: We saw that a
court, when interpreting a treaty, can consider in evidence the conduct
of political officers subsequent to its execution. 1 2 Would not such
precedents sanction the admission in evidence of the Soviet Union's
actions in U. N. political organs which confirm its fixed purpose and
strategy as officially announced and as pursued at San Francisco?
But aside from the use or effect of travaux priparatoires for better
or for worse, with such a record of futility in the U. N. as an agency
for world order, what is the prospect? What inherent chance is there
that a cure could develop within the organization itself? Could it come
from the Security Council? The great majority of U. N. States are
quite free to disregard the June 7, '45 Statement by the sponsoring
powers at San Francisco on the meaning of procedural matters in the
Charter's Article 27. But as long as the Soviet Union remains in
U. N., and as long as the U. S. A. and U. K. treat the Statement as
binding upon them, how could the Court ever have an opportunity to
interpret the phrase and so perhaps to break the Council's isolation
121. See pp. 297-8 supra.
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from the Court? Some day a request by the Assembly for an advisory
opinion might be so framed as to give the Court an opportunity to
interpret procedural matters in Article 27. If the Court possessed the
constructive boldness of Chief Justice Marshall and his colleagues in
Marbury v. Madison, and seized its slender opportunity as they did,
its opinion might have at least the effect of freeing the U. S. A. and
U. K. from any sense of obligation (if they should then still feel it),
created by their concurrence in the joint June 7, '45 Statement of the
sponsoring powers on the meaning of procedural matters. A political
solution might then be hoped for. But the winding road among con-
tingencies is dark and probably impassable.
It remains for us to consider in general whether action in the
Council can come to be affected by advisory opinions given to the
Assembly. Suppose that the domestic jurisdiction question is dealt
with by the Court in the advisory proceedings concerning the
Mindszenty trial, or Southwest Africa's status, or in some other: could
this in turn affect action of the Council as now constituted in situa-
tions that present such a question? The possibility seems remote.
First, Article 59 of the Statute provides that the Court's decision even
in a contentious case "has no binding force except between the parties
and in respect of that particular case"; and Article 68 directs that the
Court shall be guided in its advisory functions by applicable provisions
as to contentious cases. Secondly, an advisory opinion can under the
Charter be disregarded even by the political organ that receives it.1 23
Thirdly, the Soviet Union (or any other permanent Member) could
legally, under the plain meaning of Article 27, paralyze by veto any
proposal for the Council's non-procedural action, be it a call to Mem-
bers for cooperation in armed force or in economic boycott, or an
order, or a recommendation, or even a mere finding that a situation
presents the likelihood of international friction.
No relief from the U. N.'s ordeal can be had through amending
the Charter, for Article 108 enables any permanent Member alone to
veto a proposed amendment. As matters stand, no cure seems avail-
able within the framework of the Charter's Article 27 and the five-
Power Statement together, or even within that of the former alone.
By contriving exclusion, wholly of the Court, and largely of the Coun-
cil, from any effective function for reducing international friction, the
Soviet Union seems so to have frustrated the United Nations Organiza-
tion, as now constituted and controlled, that nothing can arrest its
rapid degeneration.
123. See HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 2 at 511-3.
